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About the Study: The Rule of Law and Mexico’s Energy Reform/Estado 
de Derecho y Reforma Energética en México 
The 2013 changes to the constitutional framework and the summer 2014 enabling 
legislation in Mexico’s energy industry represent a thorough break with the prevailing 
national narrative as well as the political and legal traditions of twentieth century Mexico. 
Mexico is about to embark on an unprecedented opening of its energy sector in the midst 
of important unknown factors, as well as a fiercely competitive and expanding 
international energy market. Mexico is one of the last developing countries to open its 
energy sector to foreign investment, and although there are important lessons that can be 
learned from other countries’ experiences, this does not imply that the opening will be 
necessarily as successful as the government promises or that the implementation of the 
new laws will go smoothly. Almost certainly, after the enabling legislation goes into effect, 
important questions of law will emerge during the implementation, and unavoidably, 
refinements to the legislation will have to take place.  
The book “Estado de Derecho y Reforma Energética en México,” published in México by 
Tirant lo Blanch and written in Spanish, is the culmination of a major research effort to 
examine rule of law issues arising under the energy reform in Mexico by drawing on 
scholars and experts from American and Mexican institutions in order to bring attention to 
the different component parts of the new Mexican energy sector from a legal standpoint. 
Study Authors 
 
Regina M. Buono 
Gabriel Cavazos 
Guadalupe Correa Cabrera 
Josefina Cortés 
José Ramón Cossío Barragán 
José Ramón Cossío Díaz 
José del Tronco 
Ana Elena Fierro Ferraez 
Hector Fix Fierro 
Miriam Grunstein 
Mara Hernández 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Francisco J. Monaldi 
Isidro Morales Moreno 
Ana Lilia Moreno 
Tony Payan 
Alejandro Posadas 
Eduardo Pérez Motta 
Pilar Rodríguez 
Luis Rubio  
Luis Serra  
Alberto Abad Suarez Ávila
 Energy Reform and Socio-environmental Conflicts 
	 4 
This essay addresses the transcendental energy reform in Mexico from a socio-legal 
perspective that analyzes the possible scenarios of socio-environmental conflict that may 
arise during the implementation process, which is currently underway, as well as the 
probable institutional responses. For such purpose, these reflections will focus on the 
hydrocarbons industry, the area which I believe will experience the greatest variation and 
concentration of social-environmental conflict over the short and medium term. 
 
The change of the regulatory paradigm for hydrocarbons is accompanied by significant 
transformations in the structure of the political and social environment in which the 
industry will operate. Previously, the state monopoly represented by the Mexican company 
Petróleos Mexicanos (PEMEX) operated in an environment that was mainly characterized 
by: a) a public discourse that promoted a development model based on oil dependency; b) 
public acceptance of the social and environmental impact resulting from the work of 
PEMEX; and c) PEMEX’s opacity with respect to its operations.  
 
Despite the fact that the socio-environmental conflicts related to energy matters in other 
Latin American countries have multiplied since the 1990s and continue until the present, 
the three characteristics listed above allowed PEMEX’s activities to have a low incidence 
and perception of scarce conflict. Within the context of a liberalized energy sector, it is 
noted that such characteristics will hardly be maintained; therefore, there is a higher risk of 
the emergence and visibility of socio-environmental conflicts. The distance that the State 
will maintain with respect to the new economic players, a public opinion that is more 
critical of the socio-environmental impact of energy and extraction activities, and greater 
transparency in the sector make it possible to foresee the emergence of a social context 
with greater conflict, which will bring Mexico closer to a scenario similar to cases in other 
parts of Latin America.  
 
The new legislation establishes some conditions to decrease risks, such as the inclusion of 
residents’ right to be consulted and compensated for the use of community land for 
extractive activities. Even in this manner, it is foreseen that Mexico will have to accept a 
future with greater socio-environmental conflict. It is predicted that, in addition to the 
traditional extra-institutional arrangements to resolve such conflicts and the expertise of the 
new players who will participate in the sector, an avenue for resolving conflicts through the 
judicial system will be created. Greater institutional autonomy with respect to the executive 
branch, a new constitutional paradigm guided by international human rights laws, the 
introduction of collective or class action proceedings, and the reform of amparo 
proceedings would make Mexican judges arbitrators of the predicted new socio-
environmental conflicts regarding energy issues.  
 
Socio-environmental Conflicts in Latin America 
 
Latin America has a long history of conflict over natural resources. Control over the 
utilization of water, minerals, gas, and oil represents an economic, political, and social 
dynamic that defines the nations’ respective histories in a way that contrasts with 
occurrences in the northern part of the world.1 Since the 1990s, the discussion regarding 
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the use of natural resources in connection with development in the region has taken on the 
form of socio-environmental conflicts. According to Guillaume Fontaine:  
 
“In the 1990s, the development of international and domestic law led to 
greater consideration of environmental protection and greater 
recognition of the rights of the affected populations. This phenomenon 
not only affected the practices of NGOs and other defenders of the 
environment, human rights, or rights of indigenous people, but also the 
policy of multilateral organizations and that of the State in Colombia and 
Ecuador. This development can be interpreted in one of two ways: that 
the NGOs played a decisive role in the change of the practices of 
economic players, or that the latter assumed a growing commitment on a 
social level, imposed upon them by public policies and the need to 
improve their image to reflect a ‘new corporate culture.’ Either way, this 
is the context within which the resolution of socio-environmental 
conflicts went beyond the social and community domain to make its way 
into the political and legal arena, both domestically and internationally.”2  
 
Socio-environmental conflicts may involve the State, companies, communities, farmers, 
residents, and activists.3 Each of them has a different approach with respect to natural 
resources and extractive activities. For the State, natural resources are a means of 
development. For companies, natural resources represent a consumable good that is the 
basis of their productive activities, extraction, and trading. For communities and farming 
residents, natural resources are not a means, but rather an integral part of their very lives 
and worldview. Finally, for nongovernmental organizations, natural resources are 
susceptible to beneficial use, only if the rights of the communities are not seriously violated 
and no extensive environmental impact is caused because of their utilization.4  
 
Latin America has a specific context that has resulted in socio-environmental conflicts 
taking on characteristics that are different from conflicts in other regions of the world.5 In 
the Northern Hemisphere, there is an important movement toward an environmentalist 
vision that emphasizes natural preservation and the need to reduce the negative ecological 
impact of extractive activities. This concern in Latin America—and, in general, in the 
Southern Hemisphere—is joined by worry over the impact on communities and 
populations living in the locations where such activities are conducted, as well as by the 
frustration that little of these resources remain for local development.6  The economic 
dynamics within which the extraction of resources occurs creates significant social tensions 
in the extraction sites in the Southern Hemisphere.7 
As a result of the high impact caused by energy-related extraction activities, the socio-
environmental conflicts surrounding them are particularly fierce.8 For the region, energy 
projects entail risks such as “contamination of soils and waters, consecutive colonization 
through the penetration of roads in areas of primary forests and indigenous territories, as 
well as the exacerbation of social tensions that are caused by the enclave economy that is 
created through petroleum activities.”9 
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Add to this set of problems the fact that Latin American societies have been inefficient in 
terms of constructing an industrial apparatus that allows the communities themselves to 
extract and utilize the natural resources and spread the benefits to their members. In 
general, they are societies that also are critical of industrial extractive activity using foreign 
capital.10 Furthermore, in the Americas, indigenous communities have organized to 
challenge the exploitation of natural resources, and their claims are supported by a 
network of international organizations with a great capacity for mobilization.11  
 
Socio-environmental conflict in Latin America is one of the most relevant topics on the 
national political agenda, even as the problems materialize at the local level. A significant 
part of the recent growth of the human rights discourse in the region is due to its 
usefulness as a defense mechanism against extractive activities. In these countries, the 
dispute with respect to socio-environmental conflict has become professionalized, and 
significant networks of activists as well as attorneys specializing in these cases have been set 
up. At the same time, the judiciary has been incrementally involved in the resolution of 
such conflicts. In addition to the judicialization of these conflicts, which creates high 
economic costs for those involved, the high degree of conflict produces a similar growth of 
the issue at the national political level and in terms of public opinion, and can even cause 
strong tensions in international relationships whenever such conflicts involve companies 
with foreign capital.12 
 
Why is There a Perception of Low Socio-environmental Conflict With 
Respect to Hydrocarbons in Mexico? 
 
Unlike what happens in other regions in Latin America, it is difficult to remember any 
socio-environmental conflict regarding hydrocarbons that impacted the national agenda in 
Mexico. This is not because there are no socio-environmental conflicts in the country: like 
what has happened in the rest of the region since the end of the 1990s, with the increase in 
the social structures of dispute, conflicts have increased as well. Cases regarding the 
contamination of rivers due to mining activities, the control and beneficial use of waters, or 
the construction of hydroelectric dams are frequently found both in newspaper headlines 
as well as on the Supreme Court’s agenda.13 However, no issues have impacted public 
opinion in a manner that forced discussion on the clash between the rights of 
communities, environmental impact, and industrial hydrocarbons extraction activities. Not 
even nongovernmental organizations in the region have these issues on their agenda.14 
 
In Mexico, the visibility of socio-environmental conflict caused by industrial hydrocarbons 
activities is low, despite the fact that it is an important oil-producing country on a 
worldwide level. Trying to explain this situation is complicated, although it is easier to 
understand when examining the interactions between the State, Mexican society, and 
PEMEX regarding the hydrocarbons industry from a sociological perspective. The main 
argument is that socio-environmental conflict in Mexico was attenuated and sometimes 
rendered invisible through a combination characteristics, described below. 
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Hydrocarbons as a Public Discourse Concerning National Development  
The discourse regarding economic and social development was important for the political 
configuration of governments worldwide in the twentieth century. In the case of Mexico, 
the post-revolutionary society found its identity in oil development, an identity that began 
to weaken in general with Mexico’s entry into global markets in the late twentieth century 
and which has started to disappear since the approval of the energy reform in 2013. 
 
Lázaro Cárdenas, president of Mexico between 1934 and 1940, nationalized the petroleum 
industry (1938). In addition, he was the architect of the idea of developing Mexico around 
this industry. The global context prior to the Second World War, which was highly 
industrialized and demanded oil, allowed Cárdenas and his team to envision the 
importance of oil for the global economy and the growth of the country.15  
 
Cárdenas was one of the Mexican presidents with the greatest success in terms of a long-term 
vision. In addition to betting on the petroleum industry as the motor for the country’s 
development, he attempted to resolve the long-standing problem of land ownership through 
the implementation of an agrarian distribution plan. His vision was not solely focused on the 
economic issue; he gave his political party an institutional identity by grouping the corporate 
bodies within the Mexican Revolution Party.16 His work modernized public administration: 
he removed the revolutionary generals from the political arena to empower a young 
bureaucracy, and extended the presidential term from four years to six years to allow the 
ruling president to organize a significant government project. 
 
Cárdenas was turned into a legend by the Mexican political class, viewed as the one 
responsible for moving the country toward modernity, based on four pillars: land, 
education, oil, and sovereignty.17 Until very recently, March 18, the day the oil 
expropriation was established, was considered a national holiday in Mexico. For a long 
time, the true hero of the Mexican Revolution was neither of the war-winning generals but 
rather Cardenas, the general who managed to consolidate a successful development project 
for the country. 
 
Even though the subsequent governments did not follow up on many of his social projects, 
his promotion of a long-term vision regarding development is considered the basis for 
what, in economic history, is called the “stabilizing development” or the “Mexican miracle,” 
a period of 30 years—from 1940 to 1970—during which the Mexican economy enjoyed 
unparalleled prosperity.  
 
The legacy of General Cárdenas continues to be one of the greatest legends of the Mexican 
political class. In the announcement of his constitutional reform initiative for the energy 
sector, President Enrique Peña Nieto alluded to Cárdenas’ legacy and claimed that his 
reform project aligned with the ideals of Cárdenas.18 The Mexican political parties, mainly 
those center and left ideologically, respect his image and legacy. In the political discourse 
in Mexico, oil was not only a natural resource, but rather symbolized, for a long time, the 
possibility of development and modernization in the country.  
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The economic opening of Mexico toward private investment since the 1990s modified the 
nation’s development model and steered it toward integration with the global market and 
free trade principles.19 At the time when the country’s entry into the North American Free 
Trade Agreement taught Mexicans a new developmental paradigm based on global 
markets, the emergency of the 1994 Zapatista Uprising in Chiapas started to show the 
weaknesses of the national development discourse from a local context.20   
 
Step by step, as can be corroborated in other essays of this volume, the energy sector was 
opening up areas of participation for private investment within activities managed by 
PEMEX.21 In spite of this, PEMEX maintained its monopoly over the hydrocarbons sector 
until the 2013 reform as the pillar of Mexico’s development ideal, accompanied by the 
Mexican economy’s dependency on oil almost 20 years after NAFTA. As soon as the 
hydrocarbons industry has been fully opened up to private investment, it will be very hard 
to connect PEMEX with the discourse of national development, at least insofar as activities 
conducted by new relevant economic players other than PEMEX are concerned, which 
might make the continuation of the development discourse difficult for much more time 
to come.22 
 
Acceptance of Domestic Public Opinion Regarding the Social and Environmental Impact 
Caused by PEMEX through Its Local Activities 
Public opinion in Mexico supported the extractive activities conducted by PEMEX and 
accepted the socio-environmental impact generated by hydrocarbons as one of the 
necessary costs involved in the production of wealth. One of the prevailing ideas in the 
relationship between oil and development in the country was that modernization entails 
similar and unavoidable social and environmental costs.23 
 
Finding data that support this argument is complicated because public opinion studies did 
not become popular in Mexico until the last decade. The idea that society and public 
opinion have a high degree of acceptance of hydrocarbons extraction activities is based on 
qualitative aspects. For example, until the 1990s, the anniversary of the oil expropriation 
was a national holiday and, therefore, government employees and schools were off; 
textbooks described the petroleum expropriation as an act of national sovereignty that 
permitted national development. Even in the murals great artists of the past century like 
Diego Rivera and David Alfaro Siqueiros painted in city halls, oil and petroleum are shown 
as symbols of the modern character of the Mexican nation.  
 
Currently, Mexicans’ perceptions of PEMEX and its extractive activity continues to be 
positive, even though this approval is not unanimous. In a 2013 survey by the Center of 
Social Studies and Public Opinion regarding Mexicans’ opinions of PEMEX, 6 percent said 
they had a very good opinion, 33 percent indicated good, 25 percent regular, 22 percent poor, 
and 10 percent very poor. The survey also asked: “How proud are you of PEMEX?” About 16 
percent of the respondents said very proud, 28 percent a little proud, 24 percent somewhat, 
and 30 percent not at all. This survey shows that two out of three Mexicans have a favorable 
opinion and feel proud of PEMEX.  
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In 2008, the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM) and PEMEX conducted a 
study regarding social involvement strategies for petroleum activity related to the Tertiary 
Gulf Oil project.24 The results illustrate what happens on a local level, outside of the national 
discourse, in terms of interaction between residents of communities where the industry 
operates. The study was conducted in 13 municipalities in the states of Veracruz, Puebla, 
and Tamaulipas, which are located in the Gulf of Mexico region; the survey included a total 
of 6,485 people, with 90 in-depth interviews and 10 focus groups.  
 
PEMEX’s trade union and executives are not perceived to be trustworthy by the general 
population. On a scale of 0 to 10 for the question “How much do you believe what they 
say?” the trade union obtained an average score of 6.31 and PEMEX executives 6.23. These 
scores are better than those of police officers, deputies, senators, and political parties, but 
much lower than those of officials and entities at the top of the list (teachers, the army, the 
Catholic Church, human rights commissions, and NGOs). 
 
In response to the question regarding phrases that are associated with PEMEX, the 
population relates PEMEX positively with “temporary work,” “oil, industry, job center for 
workers,” and “PEMEX is for the workers of PEMEX.” In terms of negative associations, the 
following phrases emerged: “bureaucratic, difficult, and creates obstacles”; “gives you 
money, but charges you, because it destroys the ecology”; “nothing more than reputation 
and poorly set up, because it no longer is what it claims to be”; “only oil, because oil means 
a benefit, but what are we getting out of this?”; “corruption, prepotency, employment”; 
“disorder, contamination, and lack of equality, because they take the money and leave 
nothing behind.”  
 
The population perceives that the main advantages of PEMEX’s presence in the 
community are more jobs (25.3 percent), economic growth (17.2 percent), better roads (12.1 
percent), social assistance (10.1 percent), and medical services (8.3 percent). The main 
disadvantages of PEMEX’s presence are explosions and leaks (29.7 percent), contamination 
(27.6 percent), corruption (5.5 percent), lack of maintenance (5.3 percent), and no hiring of 
local people (5.2 percent). In addition, 10.2 percent stated that there were no disadvantages. 
 
Further, 37.2 percent of respondents have a good image of PEMEX, 32.2 percent an average 
image, and 30.7 percent a poor image. In terms of PEMEX’s operations, 4.3 percent of the 
population stated that it was very good, 34.4 percent good, 30.4 percent neither good nor bad, 
19.5 percent bad, 3.7 percent very bad, and 7.7 percent did not know. In terms of the 
improvement in the living conditions of the general population due to PEMEX’s presence 
in the region, 8.5 percent said that living conditions had improved a lot, 12.9 percent 
somewhat, 32.4 percent a little, and 3.4 percent not at all.  
 
The general public perception of PEMEX has gone down over time, even though PEMEX 
remains, in the social imaginary, one of the institutional pillars of the country. The recent 
global oil price crisis as well as the liberalization of the sector have caused the company’s 
reputation to cease to be a central political issue. The new reality of the industry might 
allow this formerly massively favorable opinion of PEMEX’s actions on a national level to 
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become built more on the new relationships PEMEX and the other companies 
participating in the energy sector establish at the local levels.  
 
Opacity in the Actions of Petróleos Mexicanos 
The opacity of PEMEX’s actions contributes to the fact that the public knows very little 
about the socio-environmental conflicts caused by its industrial activities. Submerged in 
the national development discourse, local conflicts have not received any attention by the 
public, partly because there is very little information available regarding PEMEX’s work 
and partly because, with a few notable exceptions, little specialized investigative journalism 
is conducted in Mexico. 
 
PEMEX and its branch offices accounted for 4.75 percent of the appeals for review filed 
with the Federal Institute of Access to Information (today the National Institute of Access to 
Information) between 2003 and 2014; thus, PEMEX accrued the second-highest number of 
claims of denials or statements of non-existing information across the entire public sector, 
behind only the Mexican Armed Forces.25 
 
One example of PEMEX’s opacity is the recommendation by the National Human Rights 
Commission regarding the issue filed by Contralínea magazine against the public oil 
company. A group of journalists and executives from Contralínea and Fortuna magazines 
complained to the National Human Rights Commission that “between November 2004 
and August 2008, it carried out journalistic research and publications that involved 
irregular acts by officials and contractors of PEMEX” and that “based on this journalistic 
work, we have been the target of harassment and threats by executives and attorneys of the 
companies that were involved in the newspaper reports.”26 The journalists were sued 
before the judiciary branch of the State of Jalisco and, among other actions, PEMEX 
suspended purchases of official advertising in the magazines and prohibited its officials 
from granting interviews to the outlets.   
 
In its ruling regarding the case, the National Human Rights Commission concluded that 
the rights of the journalists had been violated, based on the following: “Petróleos 
Mexicanos has no objective, clear, transparent, and non-discriminatory procedures and 
criteria for the allocation of official advertising.” Furthermore, it deemed that “the public 
officials of Petróleos Mexicanos, through their conduct, failed to comply with the rules set 
forth in Articles 134, Paragraph Seven, of the Political Constitution of the United Mexican 
States, which imposes a duty upon all public officials to impartially apply public resources 
under their responsibility.”  
 
The Contralínea case shows that PEMEX’s policy for allocating public resources for 
advertising responded to a logic of strict control over public communication. As a result 
of the reform and the liberalized hydrocarbons sector, and in the absence of a powerful 
state-backed company such as PEMEX, it certainly is more complicated to maintain iron-
fisted control over information and the allocation of resources for advertising in the 
media.27 It is likely that we will find out more about socio-environmental conflicts in 
energy matters that occur at the local level, and in all likelihood, the door will open for 
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the emergence of specialized journalism covering the activities of the energy industries, 
which will act with increased freedom. More information will increase civic knowledge 
regarding the occurrence of relevant socio-environmental conflicts as the media 
broadcasts these types of problems more widely; over time, this will increase analysis of 
energy industry activities from a local context, a change that the new players in the 
industry must very much keep in mind.  
 
New companies using both domestic and foreign capital to participate in the hydrocarbons 
sector must be attentive to this situation, because in all likelihood, they will not enjoy the 
lax scrutiny PEMEX experienced in terms of public opinion. Further, in a number of 
sectors, private participation, especially that of foreign capital, is viewed with a negative 
connotation.  
 
Socio-environmental Conflicts and Institutional Responses Today and 
into the Future 
 
Despite the low incidence and low visibility of socio-environmental conflict related to 
hydrocarbons, it is possible to find examples of such challenges in the Mexican history. 
There have been urban and rural socio-environmental conflicts, even though there is little 
information available about them. In general, public opinion paid more attention to the 
environmental tragedies in urban centers in the 1980s and 1990s than to situations that 
generated extensive damage to the environment and communities where much of the 
petroleum industry operates, mainly on the coast of the Gulf of Mexico.  
 
To date, institutional responses to socio-environmental conflicts in Mexico have been 
more political than legal. Characteristic of the Mexican corporatism that has survived until 
the present, most socio-environmental conflicts are resolved informally, through extra-
institutional arrangements involving PEMEX executives, representatives of local 
governments, the petroleum trade union, and the communities or small land owners 
without, as noted above, any academic or documentary investigations reflecting these 
processes.  
 
One common way to handle conflicts over the use of land where the industry operates or 
where the damage caused by its transit occurs is to grant economic benefits to the community, 
provide public services such as energy or paving, or hire a certain number of local residents to 
work for the company. Negotiations regarding socio-environmental conflicts in rural areas 
takes on some of the traditional forms of the PRI-based Mexican corporatism, even though the 
party no longer has representatives in many areas of the country. 
 
PEMEX has exercised broad decision-making capacity in negotiating with local 
communities and small landowners, which no other company has had. PEMEX is a priority 
for the federal and local governments, and as such, has enjoyed the ability to use a wide 
variety of economic and political resources. Whenever PEMEX’s negotiating capacity has 
failed, the Mexican public institutions assigned to resolve conflicts became involved. 
Several of the complaints have been processed by the National Human Rights Commission 
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(CNDH), which issued recommendations against the company’s activities, all of them in 
rural areas. The conflicts reported by the CNDH are examples of the contemporary 
configuration of these tensions in the areas where the Mexican petroleum industry 
operates, which the new participating players must take into account. One important 
element is that, until now, the judiciary has not had a significant role in the resolution of 
socio-environmental conflicts regarding hydrocarbons, unlike, for example, in the case of 
conflicts regarding mining or control of waters. 
  
Urban Socio-environmental Conflicts 
The ecological tragedies that occurred in urban areas led to changes in industrial and 
environmental policies. In the 1980s, poor air quality in Mexico City caused one of the 
darkest environmental crises in the region, marking one of the country’s first major socio-
environmental conflicts. After several days of contingency actions in response to the 
presence of airborne contaminants, the federal government announced the 
Comprehensive Program Against Atmospheric Contamination of Mexico City 
Metropolitan Area (PICCA) 1990, which included five courses of action: i) improvement of 
fuels; ii) expansion of public transportation and establishment of strict control of vehicle 
emissions; iii) improvement (modernization) of combustion processes and control of 
emissions caused by industries and services; iv) ecological restoration; and v) 
environmental education and research and social participation. At that time, studies 
showed that the industrial sector accounted for 27.7 percent of the total air toxicity, only 
behind the transportation sector, which was responsible for 42.4 percent. 28  
 
The program included an ecological package for PEMEX that featured 11 measures aimed 
at improving fuel quality as well as monitoring and reducing contaminating emissions 
caused by refining and storage.29 Likewise, measures were taken with respect to electricity 
generation by the Jorge Luque and Valle de México thermoelectric plants. The measures 
adopted included replacing fuel oil with natural gas, suspending the operation of two 
generating units during winter, and installing continuous emissions monitors at the 
thermoelectric plants.30  
 
One of the immediate effects was the closing of the 18 de Marzo refinery in 1991, which 
had been in operation for 60 years in the northern part of Mexico City. Authors Genaro 
Hernández Camacho and Rubén Cantú Chapa studied the process of deindustrialization in 
the Azcapotzalco area based on different factors of analysis, including environmental 
damage and its impact on the health of the residents in areas close to the refinery.31 In 
2010, after the refinery land had been abandoned for almost two decades,  a project was 
kicked off to clean the property and convert it into an area of recovered green space. In 
2012, the Bicentennial Park was inaugurated, occupying 55 hectares out of the refinery’s 
original 175 hectares and costing an 800 million-peso investment.  
 
The environmental crisis in Mexico City during the 1980s led to the growth of a social 
movement in favor of better environmental conditions and new urban regulations with 
respect to the presence of the hydrocarbons industry in urban centers. Despite the fact that 
it was considered a pillar of development in Mexico City, federal authorities forced the 
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hydrocarbons industry to leave the city, a measure taken to reduce the risk of social 
conflicts as well as great ecological damage.  
 
Other socio-environmental conflicts broke out in other Mexican cities with a high urban 
concentration such as Guadalajara—at the time the second most populated city in Mexico. 
An accident occurred on World Earth Day in a PEMEX fuel storage plant located in La 
Nogalera district, a popular area of the city.  
 
Together with the human casualties, there were serious effects for the environment, such 
as gasoline contamination in aquifers, which caused a drop in the resource’s availability, as 
well as emissions of contaminating gases as a result of the explosion. The socio-
environmental damage of the affected area extended more than 300,000 square meters, 
and 98 blocks of different constructions were destroyed. The impact included 1,632 
properties, such as farms, businesses, hotels, residences, and industrial properties, affecting 
13,930 residents. In terms of damage, 1,425 homes were destroyed and 1,575 partially 
damaged, in addition to 802 household goods, 637 vehicles, and the complete destruction 
of 450 small businesses.  
 
The accident furthermore created extreme vulnerability due to urban poverty and the slow 
governmental response. Unlike in the case of Mexico City, where the response was to remove 
the industry from urban areas, the conflict in Guadalajara turned out to be more complicated 
due to the lack of expertise to properly handle the disaster, even though one of the first 
consequences was the resignation of the governor in the months immediately following the 
tragedy. The Office of the Attorney General of the Republic initiated proceedings against local 
government officials, although ultimately, they were not put on trial. 
 
Unlike what happened in Mexico City, in the case of the explosions in Guadalajara, the 
federal government was more focused on blaming local governments for the response to 
the accident than on correcting public policy.32 Jorge Alonso identifies the explosions in 
Guadalajara as a critical point in terms of the public perception of PEMEX and a 
significant weakening of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) in national politics.33 
In 1995, the National Action Party (PAN) would win the gubernatorial election in the state, 
mainly thanks to the political opposition parties and a broad citizen movement that 
rejected the traditional corporatist ways of the PRI in resolving this type of conflict, as 
demonstrated by the governor’s removal. Alonso also points out that the damage to 
PEMEX’s image as a result of the explosions paved the way for a critical discourse 
regarding the actions of the quasi-state company in urban centers as well as the 
emergence of ideas regarding the need to modernize PEMEX and open the hydrocarbons 
industry up to the participation of other players.34  
 
We can identify two key moments of the urban socio-environmental conflict process. The 
first refers to the condition of social vulnerability in the context of a disaster in an urban 
area and the hazard posed by industrial activities in human settlements that have grown in 
an irregular manner in cities. Urban poverty, which includes an element of great 
vulnerability with respect to disasters, coupled with residents living in the close vicinity of 
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hazardous facilities, created the high risk that materialized in the explosions. On the other 
hand, the authorities failed to take preventive action in terms of safety, regulation, or re-
zoning soil use, thereby increasing the population’s high vulnerability.35 
 
The most relevant urban conflicts in Mexico, exemplified by the Mexico City and 
Guadalajara examples, illustrate the manner in which the federal government intervened 
to resolve them, whether through a change of public policy and issuing new regulations to 
the company involved, as in the case of Mexico City, or through party discipline and 
skirting legal responsibilities to instead pass blame to local officials. In both of these cases, 
the intervention of the highest decision-making bodies in the federal government to 
reduce the political fallout from the processes was evident.  
 
The handling of such conflicts during the 1980s and 1990s highlighted some of the 
characteristics of the political system at that time, such the president’s capacity to remove 
local rulers—like in the case of Jalisco—modify public policy by way of decree, and take 
control over core decisions of the company, as happened in Mexico City.  
 
In both cases, the emergence of a population that organized itself in view of the damage 
caused by industry in urban centers had more political rather than legal consequences. 
Finally, we saw how the nationalistic discourse of development linked to PEMEX began to 
wear thin, and for the first time, the public demanded limits to industrial activity for safety 
reasons and to protect the environment.  
 
Socio-environmental Conflicts in Rural Areas 
Since the 1980s and 1990s, after the aforementioned cases of socio-environmental conflict 
in Mexico City and Guadalajara, PEMEX’s industrial activities in urban centers began to be 
strictly regulated. Yet, socio-environmental conflict in rural areas was much less visible and 
handled much more on a local level, which therefore did not impact public opinion 
nationwide.  
 
Unlike urban socio-environmental conflicts, which were characterized by human and 
ecological tragedies, socio-environmental conflicts in rural areas have been based on 
ownership and land use issues in areas where the hydrocarbons industry operates, as well 
as contamination effects on those properties.   
 
In the most important petroleum region of the country—located on the coast of the Gulf of 
Mexico in the states of Tamaulipas, Veracruz, Tabasco, and Campeche—the economy, 
politics, and society revolve around the petroleum industry. There is little data on how socio-
environmental conflicts are resolved in rural areas, as many of these cases are rendered 
invisible through the lack of press coverage or academic research specializing in investigating 
and monitoring such conflicts. The testimonies of people who have worked at PEMEX or 
who reside in the area have mentioned the existence of informal arrangements between local 
authorities, company executives, the trade union, community leaders, and small land 
owners. Negotiations supposedly involve both economic arrangements and the provision of 
public services for the communities, as well as jobs with the company granted by the union.  
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One of the few existing indicators to characterize socio-environmental conflict in rural 
areas involves recommendations issued by the National Human Rights Commission 
against PEMEX based on possible violations of complainants’ rights. These complaints 
ranged from impact on their property rights and damage to the environment to violation 
of the right of physical integrity. The irregularities in terms of PEMEX’s conduct, as 
covered by the CNDH recommendations, mainly consisted of breaches of legal and 
operational rules governing its performance.36 
 
The first public recommendation involves a farmer by the name of Remigio Ullin Palma, 
who contacted the CNDH to report persecution and harassment by State authorities. The 
farmer had been accused of damaging third-party property, criminal association, and other 
crimes, based on his role as a representative of ejidatarios, a group of small landowners in 
the coastal area of the state of Tabasco. 
 
The persecution started after he and a group of farmers began compiling documented 
proof of illegal acts committed by PEMEX officials and the state of Tabasco, which 
included damage to rivers and brooks in the region due to hydrocarbons exploration and 
exploitation work conducted by PEMEX. These impacts were a result of the company’s 
failure to adopt measures to avoid damage to the ecosystem and to residents of the 
community.37    
 
Previously, the farmers had reported property damage produced by a flood and 
destruction and damage to crops and lands, as well as embezzlement by PEMEX in the use 
of federal funds to compensate the affected producers and for work performed in a 
damaged area of approximately 15,719 hectares. Likewise, the affected parties filed a public 
complaint regarding damage to the ecosystem and the nation’s assets due to modification 
of the regional lagoon system.   
 
In this case, the CNDH recommended coordination between the state of Tabasco, the 
Ministry of Urban Development and Ecology, and PEMEX on a solution that would avoid 
flooding lands used for agropecuary activities, secure the expropriation of land to be used 
by the petroleum facilities, as well as rehabilitate the affected lands. Furthermore, the 
CNDH resolved that the ejidatarios, co-owners, and small land owners had to be 
compensated and indemnified for the damages in accordance with the law, and that the 
maintenance of equipment used for petroleum exploration and exploitation had to be 
guaranteed to avoid accidents that would affect the residents and the ecological balance.   
 
Another recommendation was number 157/1995.38 In this case, a group of co-owners 
reported that PEMEX was installing a poliduct from Tierra Blanca to Veracruz, which 
illegally affected their properties and possessions. They added that PEMEX employees 
were preventing the homeowners from doing any construction on their land, something 
the company had been doing for years, and that, since their dwellings were made from 
wood, PEMEX’s legal representative considered their homes incipient and treated the 
residents as trespassers. The group also pointed out that state authorities refused to issue 
them their property titles, arguing that they were settling in a prohibited area. 
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The CNDH demonstrated that the complainants had legitimately purchased the properties, 
which they had occupied since 1964; that they built their homes from wood, in most cases 
due to a lack of economic resources; that the poliduct was installed by PEMEX after the 
homes were built; and that the complainants had complied with all of their obligations to 
document their legal ownership of the property, a fact that had been denied without any 
basis through arbitrary actions aimed at preserving PEMEX’s interests. Based on the 
foregoing, it was recommended that the titles owed to the complainants should be issued, 
and a recommendation was issued to PEMEX’s managing director to order employees to 
cease harassment of the complainants, and to compensate them in accordance with the law 
if the owners were forced to abandon their properties for safety reasons. 
 
Recommendation 80/96,39 dated August 23, 1996, referred to the explosion that took place 
on February 16, 1995, in the settlement of Plátano y Cacao in the Third Section of 
Municipio del Centro in Tabasco. It was sent to the governor of the state of Tabasco; the 
secretary of environmental affairs, natural resources, and fishing; the attorney general of 
the Republic; and the managing director of PEMEX. 
 
The complainants reported that the development of the petroleum industry in the area led 
to a series of negative ecological impacts, among them three explosions in 1995 that caused 
serious damage and were not properly indemnified. Therefore, in addition to a review for 
compensation payments, the complainants requested that two schools be relocated, and 
that PEMEX transfer the pipelines that were crossing settlements or expropriate those 
lands so that the residents could be transferred to a safe location.  
 
The CNDH determined that indemnification payments for the February 16, 1995, 
explosion had to be made in accordance with the guidelines set forth by the Commission 
of Evaluations of National Assets, and it recommended that the government of the state of 
Tabasco and PEMEX study the necessary actions so that the Interinstitutional Commission 
for Environmental Affairs and Social Development could conduct an assessment of the 
problems posed by petroleum facilities on human settlements in the rights of way, among 
other measures. 
 
Afterwards, the CNDH received a complaint filed by Arturo Ramos Córdova, who stated 
that the seismological prospecting activities conducted by PEMEX caused different kinds of 
damage in the communities of several municipalities in Tabasco as well as the rupture of 
wells and cracks in pools, in addition to causing a drop in agricultural production; he 
argued that all of these issues were a violation of the human rights principles of legality, 
legal security, and property, in addition to jeopardizing human health, the ecological 
balance, and the region’s environment.  
 
Another case regarding breach of safety standards and regulations was filed regarding a 
PEMEX-owned oil platform. Recommendation 14/2009 40 was issued on February 19, 
2009, identifying violations of the basic rights of legality, legal security, physical integrity, 
and safety in the workplace of the aggrieved parties. The complainants also stated that, in 
addition to a failure to comply with the applicable safety standards and regulations, there 
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was insufficient training of employees, which led to the deaths of 22 people and injuries to 
another 68 people in the Bay of Campeche. 
 
In this case, the commission concluded that indemnities for the deceased workers and 
medical and psychological care for the injured needed to be paid. Furthermore, the 
commission recommended implementing adequate and permanent training of PEMEX 
workers not only regarding the performance of their tasks, but rather also for the 
protection of their physical integrity and life, with a special focus on the use of safety 
equipment available at each PEMEX company.  
 
The foregoing are examples of rural socio-environmental conflicts that were addressed by 
the National Human Rights Commission. They are a sample of the actual socio-
environmental conflicts that have arisen in the country, which, based on our prediction, 
will be more visible and relevant on the national agenda over the coming years.41 
 
One characteristic of socio-environmental conflicts in rural areas in Mexico, specifically in 
the Gulf area, is that, unlike in other places in Latin America, they have not been 
accompanied by active participation from nongovernmental organizations, which typically 
jump onboard and exercise pressure on public opinion. The protagonists of the negotiations 
to settle these conflicts are community leaders as well as regional oil executives and local 
governments. As indicated earlier, there also has not been any investigative journalism or 
academic studies covering these occurrences, their scope, and the kinds of arrangements 
made to address these conflicts, beyond anecdotal evidence from those who participated in 
such agreements in an official capacity. The areas in which PEMEX operates in the Gulf of 
Mexico are opaque, with iron-fisted control both by officials as well as community leaders 
themselves. It does not need to be mentioned that many of these areas have a native 
population that is not strongly connected with national policy.  
 
What little is known about socio-environmental conflicts in rural areas demonstrates a 
scenario similar to that of other regions of Latin American, where the main problem is 
ownership and use of land as well as the ecological damage caused by the hydrocarbons 
extraction industry. However, its social characterization is different insofar as these are 
areas in Mexico that have remained closed off from the influences of nongovernmental 
organizations and where it appears that settlements made through informal institutions are 
sufficient to prevent these conflicts from escalating to matters of national public concern.  
For the new players, the coast of the Gulf of Mexico appears to be a social playground in 
which informal negotiations between the company, local politicians, and communities 
have been prioritized through the exchange of benefits and losses, a viewpoint greatly 
supported by the characteristics mentioned in the preceding section. The area also remains 
a stronghold of the corporatist power management model and a stable political class. With 
the exception of Tabasco, which has been ruled by a Party of the Democratic Revolution 
(PRD) governor since 2013, the other states have been governed by the PRI for several 
decades, which has had a great impact on the way politics is conducted and the 
negotiations with the different players involved with the hydrocarbons industry.  
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Who Will Resolve Socio-environmental Conflicts during the 
Implementation of the Energy Reform in the Hydrocarbons Sector, and 
How Will They Be Resolved?  
 
The above question is of utmost significance for the future of the hydrocarbons industry in 
the country as well as for environmental protection and the rights of communities in the 
areas where such activities will be conducted. It is predicted that the greatest risks of 
conflicts will appear in those areas where the new economic players will launch operations.  
 
Most of the discussions regarding the reform focused on addressing relevant points of 
tension where greater conflict is foreseeable over the short term. It is not clear whether the 
privileged context PEMEX enjoyed to reduce and make socio-environmental conflicts 
virtually invisible, as described above, still remains. Based on the discussions and 
predictions of the reform with respect to this issue, we think that the very legislators who 
crafted the energy reform foresaw a scenario of greater conflict than in the case of the 
preceding period. 
 
The new legislation contemplates scenarios to reduce risks, mainly related to ownership 
and enjoyment of land where extractive activities are conducted. Emphasis is placed on 
acknowledging residents’ right to be consulted and on the compensation that will be paid 
to residents and native communities for use of their land; for such purpose, special 
agencies have been created to provide assistance during these processes.42 The right to be 
consulted is probably the most relevant one for predicting socio-environmental conflicts 
within the scope of the new legislation. Recognized initially by international law in 
Convention 169 of the International Labor Organization and later in the United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in 2007, the right to be consulted took on 
its current form43 and achieved constitutional standing through Mexico’s constitutional 
reform in 2011, which recognizes the rules of international treaties in matters of protecting 
human rights.  
 
The new regulatory entities’ lack of experience in handling such conflicts, especially when 
involving foreign capital companies, makes it possible to predict that federal and state 
agencies are not the most efficient players to resolve these types of problems. Even so, the 
participation of the State as a sovereign and regulatory body makes it necessary to foresee 
how these types of socio-environmental conflicts will be resolved in the future. 
 
Another possibility for resolving socio-environmental conflicts that may arise in Mexico 
over the short term is that State intervention is decreased to utilize the expertise of the 
participating industries—mainly international—and nongovernmental organizations to 
establish new rules for identifying and resolving these conflicts without intervention by 
State authorities. This therefore reduces the protagonist role the State has experienced so 
far in terms of resolving conflicts via political channels in the form of settlements from 
local political groups. 
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Finally, another foreseeable scenario is that the federal judiciary becomes an active 
arbitrator of socio-environmental conflicts, more than any other public body, meaning 
that conflicts will be resolved legally and formally rather than on the basis of extra-
institutional arrangements, as is currently the case. The possibility that such conflicts will 
be disputed in court whenever the State is involved is due to the institutional autonomy 
achieved in recent years, which has made it possible to explore new avenues of resolution. 
In addition, three recent constitutional reforms provide a suitable institutional framework 
to increase the judiciary’s participation in the sector.  
 
In the rest of the Latin American region, this type of conflict is fiercely debated within the 
jurisdictional scope, using international human rights law. Likewise, it is important to note 
that, for the resolution of other types of socio-environmental conflicts related to topics 
such as water, mining, or use of transgenics, the judiciary already plays a significant role. 
 
Recently, the federal judiciary has been one of the institutions with the greatest rate of 
growth in Mexico. Since the end of the 1990s, it has gained institutional autonomy and 
established itself as a relevant arbitrator within the scope of different conflicts, in addition 
to commencing interesting work in terms of the protection of human rights. This 
movement matches that of the rest of the Latin American region, where national judiciary 
branches have grown substantially over the same period.44  
 
Nowadays, the federal judiciary also has an institutional framework which, although not 
suitable, allows increased intervention in the resolution of socio-environmental conflicts, 
something it did not have until this past decade. The constitutional reforms make it 
possible to expand the roster of players that may initiate judicial proceedings, justifying the 
rationale of the judiciary’s resolutions within the discourse regarding human rights. The 
three reforms are known as the reform of human rights, the reform of amparo proceedings, and 
the reform of collective actions.  
 
The first, the reform of human rights, is recognized at a constitutional level as a component of 
international treaties to which Mexico is a party, which may include rules regarding the 
protection of human rights and require all authorities to promote, respect, protect, and 
guarantee such rights.45 The second reform, known as the reform of amparo proceedings, 
refers to the modification of procedural rules for amparo proceedings—a historical means 
for the protection of human rights—to incorporate the legitimate interests of individuals 
and social players in different cases, permitting a broader group of players to initiate 
amparo proceedings insofar as socio-environmental issues are concerned.46 The third 
reform, called the reform of collective actions, incorporates in Mexican law so-called class 
actions under Anglo-Saxon Law, which represents an ad hoc procedure to seek repair and 
prevent damage caused by the energy industry before the judiciary branch.47  
 
Comparatively, in Latin America, strategic litigation has been the legal tool most popular 
for nongovernmental organizations and communities to protect their rights and interests. 
Considering that the communities and nongovernmental organizations that intervene in 
socio-environmental conflicts act in an organized manner through regional or global 
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networks, the international human rights law has become a common framework for 
protecting the environment and reducing the impact that may be caused by energy 
industry projects, permitting an intense dialogue based on common terms.48 Furthermore, 
the new procedural rules for amparo proceedings, which permit broader legitimate interests 
and contemplate collective actions, forebode the intensification of their use by social 
players interested in socio-environmental conflicts.  
 
Combined with the autonomy of the national judiciary branches, the Inter-American 
Human Rights System, with strong momentum through the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights, has strengthened the emergence of a Latin American ius commune, which motivates 
the jurisprudential dialogue of the different judiciary branches in the region on human 
rights matters.49 In countries such as Colombia, Brazil, or Argentina, the intervention of the 
domestic courts has been relevant to resolving socio-environmental conflicts. In these 
countries, a relevant jurisprudence has developed that uses international human rights law 
as the basis of interpretation to resolve these types of conflicts. As explained by 
Balakrishnan Rajagopal, it is noteworthy that international law has taken on significant 
momentum after World War II thanks to the influence of intellectuals and social 
movements in Third World countries, which have been able to express resistance to 
contemporary ideas of development in legal terms; for this resistance, the construction of 
rights other than those of the liberal tradition is one of the most relevant characteristics.50 
The Inter-American Human Rights System is one of the strongest supporting elements for 
the resolution of socio-environmental conflicts at the national level. Article 26 of the 
American Convention on Human Rights addresses the duty of States to promote the 
progressive development of economic, social, and cultural rights. The “Protocol of San 
Salvador” regarding economic, social, and cultural rights establishes, in its Article 11, the 
right of all persons to a healthy environment and requires the participating States to 
promote the protection, preservation, and improvement of the environment.  
The jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in these matters has not 
used such articles until this present time. Rather, in its reflections regarding the right of 
property in Article 21 of the American Convention on Human Rights, the court has 
established a series of interpretations that protect indigenous and tribal communities, and 
their land ownership and relationship with the environment. The relevant jurisprudence 
established by the court with respect to indigenous and tribal community property rights 
includes granting alternative land, acknowledging customary laws of indigenous 
communities, the right of indigenous and tribal people to live freely on their territories, 
and the State’s obligation to consult with these communities.51  
A new context of disputes involves judges as arbitrators of these types of conflicts, which 
traditionally were resolved by federal and local administrative authorities whenever 
PEMEX was involved. New disputes create a new playing field with new economic costs for 
companies as well as other actors. 
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It is important to also remember that not only does the Inter-American Human Rights 
System intervene in this matter, but rather, according to Gabriel Cavazos in one section of 
this book, foreign capital investments could be protected within the scope of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement, which would allow investors to sue Mexican entities to 
defend themselves in accordance with Chapter 11 of the agreement in the event that they 
believe they are being treated in a discriminatory fashion. 
Therefore, it is likely that, as a result of the energy reform, both the incidence as well as the 
visibility of socio-environmental conflicts related to hydrocarbons activity will increase 
with the participation of new players in the industry. The new context makes it possible to 
foresee that the negotiating capacity of local politicians will be reduced, considering that 
PEMEX will cease to be the only relevant player in the energy sector. The new context of 
conflict might no longer be resolved through extra-institutional arrangements and become 
more formalized and legal, which would allow the federal judiciary to become the new 
arbitrators of this issue.  
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